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INTRODUCTION
This essay examines the implications of the recommendations of
the World Commission on Dams' Report ("Report") for the Narmada
Valley projects in India. It examines the possible outcomes of a
multi-stakeholder-based decision-making process of reviewing the
water and energy developments as recommended by the World
Commission on Dams ("WCD"). Further, it explores the various
initiatives already taken in the Narmada Valley where an intense
struggle has been occurring over the past fifteen years. Specifically,
this essay focuses on the initiatives taken in the Narmada Valley and
how such initiatives fit within the WCD Report recommendations.
Many of the previous initiatives pertaining to the large dams in the
Valley are along the directions and recommendations provided for in
the WCD Report. An examination of these initiatives allows for the
opportunity to explore the implementation of the Report in the
Narmada Valley. This analysis shows that the net result of
implementation would be positive, leading to the elimination of
inferior dams. It would also ensure that future dams are socially and
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environmentally sound, equitable, and viable, and that there would
be more room for the consideration of other alternatives. The
implementation of the WCD Report's recommendations would also
alter the contribution, the say, and the participation of various actors
who take part in the decision-making process.
This essay further examines the critiques of the Report that have
been voiced by various agencies, particularly the dam-building
establishment in India, considering the validity of these criticisms in
light of the Narmada Valley case study. The Narmada Valley
initiatives demonstrate that the major apprehension - that the process
recommended by the WCD would be lengthy and cumbersome - is
unfounded. The WCD recommendations' roots are in countries such
as India, whereas the criticism stems from the belief that the WCD's
recommendations relate to practices of "developed" countries. The
essay also examines the source of the India dam building
establishment's vehement criticism of the WCD Report,
demonstrating that one of the key reasons for this criticism
seemingly arises from the fact that WCD recommendations would
shift the power and decisions relating to large dams away from the
dam building establishment.
"Our genesis, work process and implications of this Final Report
are by nature quite political. Our mandate involves the most precious
element on earth, and that, of course, involves power: who wields it,
how to share it, which ways the state may better balance it. .. "I
"We are a Commission to heal the deep and self-inflicted wounds
torn open wherever and whenever far too few determine for far too
many how best to develop or use water and energy resources. That is
often the nature of power, and the motivation of those who question
it." 2
The struggle surrounding large dams all over the world is in
essence the struggle of the haves versus the have-nots. The struggle
has taken place since time immemorial. It is a struggle in search of

1. Kader Asmal, Chair's Preface in Globalisation Fronm Beloit, World
Commission on Dams, Danis and Development: .4New Framework lbr DecisionMaking (Nov. 2000).
2. Id.
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justice for the downtrodden, the struggle for a voice by the voiceless,
and for power by the powerless. Those fighting the insatiable and
unsustainable exploitation of the environment have added a new
dimension. The struggle against unsustainable exploitation of the
environment is a resistance of the powerless against the powerful. An
understanding of the struggles surrounding large dams elucidates
vehement reactions to the WCD Report and provides an
understanding
of what
implementation
of the
WCD
recommendations would entail.

I. BACKGROUND
A. THE WORLD COMMISSION ON DAMS AND ITS REPORT

Nelson Mandela released the WCD Report in London on
November 16, 2000. The report was followed by a series of regional
launches in various parts of the world. The release of this report
concluded the Commission's two and a half years of efforts. The
WCD's process has been unique in the annals of modern
developmental conflicts.
The struggle against large dams is one of the most visible and
dramatic of the conflicts surrounding the environmental and social
impacts of development. It is at once intensely local and global. For
example, the struggle in the Narmada Valley in India has reached
across the world. Various groups, organizations, and individuals
from all over the globe are involved in this fight as deeply as the
people living within the Valley. Similar struggles against large dams
are taking place in other parts of India, as well as Australia, Brazil,
France, Thailand, and the United States. Even in parts of the globe
where dissent is severely discouraged, strong campaigns and protests
against large dams continue to occur.
Dams are big business and command vast natural resources. Huge
vested interests are involved in pushing dams to be built. Large dams
have enormous social and environmental impacts, the nature and
extent of which is neither fully studied nor acknowledged, even in
today's highly technologically advanced world. Serious doubts have
arisen about the economic and financial viability, efficacy, and
benefits of large dams. As a result, the fights around large dams have
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been some of the most bitter and polarized ones.It is under these conditions that the WCD began its mission. Since
the Commission was composed of representatives from all sides of
the debate, there was an inherent danger that existing conflicts and
polarization would affect the Commission's work.4 In fact, the
WCD's most significant accomplishment has been its ability to
transcend the polarization and produce a unanimous report." This
unanimity is what gives the Report its legitimacy, apart from its solid
knowledge base, and its extensive consultations with a wide range of
interested and affected people. All members of the Commission dam builders, planners, operators, equipment suppliers, dam
opponents, environmentalists, and academics - have unanimously
agreed on the Report. This is what makes the report significant and
too important to ignore.
B. REACTIONS TO THE REPORT

The many favorable reactions to the Report, including those from
industry and financial institutions, are attributable to the agreement
between commissioners representing diverse perspectives. A section
of the dam building establishment, however, has come forward with
vehement and angry reactions, outright rejections, and even
allegations of conspiracy. The WCD Internet site and the compact

3. This essay does not deal with the critique of large dams. In fact, neither
does it critically analyze the WCD, its process, or the Report. These are vast topics,
whereas the focus of this essay is on the one limited aspect outlined above. In fact,
readers are assumed to have a certain amount of familiarity regarding the issues
surrounding the large dams controversy, the WCD, and its Report.
4. Some writers, including the WCD itself, often refer to the "dams debate." I
find that the word "debate" is severely limiting in this context. More accurately, a
war is taking place between the haves and have-nots. "Struggles" or "ights" are
more appropriate words.
5. One of the Commissioners, Medha Patkar of the Narmada Bachao Andolan
added a note to the Report, simply called "A Comment." The Comment, however,
is not in the nature of a dissent note. She signed the Report as have all the other
Commissioners. See WORLD COMMISSION ON DAMS, DAMS AND DEVELOPMENT: A
NEW FRAMEWORK FOR DECISION-MAKING, (Earthscan 2000) at 321-22 (setting out
several issues that the author believed were "fundamental" but never the less
"missing or not given the central place they deserve [in the report]") [hereinafter
WCD REPORT].
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disc issued by the WCD cover the important reactions.6
A review of some specific reactions will be presented later in this
essay. A brief summary of the criticisms is presented here. The
World Bank ("Bank") is avoiding acceptance of the Report by taking
refuge behind the explanation that it will have to look at the response
of its shareholders. This response is typical of the Bank, which is
loath to accept findings of its own commissions where their
recommendations are contrary to its worldview.7
The dam builders and their main organizations, International
Commission on Large Dams ("ICOLD"), International Hydropower
Association ("IHA"), and International Commission on Irrigation
and Training ("ICID"), have strongly criticized the Report.' Their
concerns are summarized as follows:
The process that the WCD recommends is "cumbersome" and
such a cumbersome process will stall future dam building;
The WCD recommendations emerge from the "developed"
countries and, thus, are suitable only for these countries;
The recommendations will create considerable uncertainty about
future projects, which could cause private developers and financiers
to lose interest in dam projects, resulting in the elimination of water
and energy projects altogether;
The WCD Report is negative in its approach. It embodies an "antidam" bias and largely ignores the positive contributions of dams;
6. This essay is not meant to provide a detailed analysis of the various
criticisms and comments on the Report. The comments of the major players are
examined in this essay to bring out the approach of these agencies to the Report
and its implementation.
7. For example, the reaction of the Bank was similar in the Morse Committee
case, which the Bank had set up in 1991 as an Independent Review of the Sardar
Sarovar Project. The Morse Report was a strong indictment of the project and
called on the Bank to step back from the project. The Bank refused. In fact, it sent
another in-house mission which tried to downplay and dilute the Morse Report's
main findings. While the Morse team took about ten months to produce the report
(many of which were spent in the field), the Bank's Mission did its work in fifteen
days.
8. It should be pointed out, however, that some of these reactions are more
nuanced than others. For example, the reaction of the IHA is much more
introspective.
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The WCD guidelines are not universally applicable, and as such,
they may prevent beneficial projects from commencing. There is a
need to develop "realistic" guidelines.
Some of the strongest and strident reaction comes from countries
involved in large-scale dam building, such as India, China, and
Turkey. Some critics in these countries have even alleged that the
WCD is a conspiracy of the developed countries that have developed
all their water resources and do not want under-developed countries
to do the same. Some also allege that the WCD is a conspiracy of the
promoters of thermal and nuclear power. Some of the key members
of the Indian dam building establishment, most notably the current
President of the ICOLD, have tried to suppress - if not sabotage the dissemination of the WCD Report in India, which they boast as
an achievement;9
"We were able to get the WCD meeting scheduled in India for
February 12, 2001, basically for propaganda purposes, canceled...
Acceptance of the WCD Report by funding agencies, especially the
World Bank, scheduled on February 15, 2001, did not succeed by
WCD in spite of their high profile." ' u
The endeavor in this essay is not to respond to these criticisms, but
to explore how the actual implementation of the WCD Report would
occur in a real-life case. In the process, this essay will examine
whether the above criticisms hold true. We look at the case of the
Narmada Valley projects in India.

I. THE NARMADA VALLEY DEVELOPMENT
PROJECTS ("NVDP")
The Narmada is the longest westward flowing river in India. It
begins at Amarkantak in the Maikal ranges in Central-East India and
flows over 1,300 kilometers to empty into the Arabian Sea. The
9. Letter from C.V.J Verma, President of the ICOLD, to Shn Navlawala,
Adviser to the Water Resources Planning Commission, Government of India (Mar.
22, 2001) (discussing the conference that was held in Delhi, February, 12, 2001,
where the ICOLD, IHA, and ICID first came together) (on file with author). Shri
Navlawala is now the Secretary at the Ministry of Water Resources with the
Government of India.

10. Id.
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ambitious NVDP proposes to build 30 large, 135 medium, and over
3000 small dams on the Narmada and its tributaries. All of these,
except the Sardar Sarovar Project, are in the state of Madhya Pradesh
("M.P."). The Sardar Sarovar Dam is being built in Gujarat but its
submergence will also extend to the states of M.P. and
Maharashtra. '
The preliminary investigations of the Narmada Valley for
"development of the Narmada Basin" were taken up in 1949. In 1955
a study was conducted to assess the hydroelectric potential of the
Narmada basin. The study found sixteen sites in the Narmada basin
with the potential of generating hydroelectric power. Project reports
for a few major projects (Broach project in Gujarat and Narmada
Sagar (Indira Sagar), Bargi, and Harinphal projects in Madhya
Pradesh) were prepared during the period of 1959-1965. The Broach
Irrigation Project, precursor of the Sardar Sarovar Project, as cleared
by the Planning Commission in August 1960, was contemplated at a
2
height of a full reservoir level ("FRL") of 162 feet.'
The Narmada Valley projects have been mired in interstate
controversies since their inception, 3 mainly regarding the issue of
sharing of the waters between Gujarat and M.P., and the height of the
Sardar Sarovar dam. Finally, a Tribunal was established under the
Inter State Water Disputes Act in 1969, and it delivered its Award in
1979. Among other things, this Award determined allocation of
Narmada waters between various states, fixed heights of the Sardar
Sarovar and Indira Sagar dams, and gave orders for the resettlement
and rehabilitation of the people to be affected by submergence of the
Sardar Sarovar. It placed on record the agreements of contending
party states about the water yield of the river at 28 Million Acre Feet
("MAF") and allocated this among the four contending states. A vast
range of benefits are projected from these projects, however, the
11. See infra Table 1 for the lists and basic details of these projects.
12. See History
of Development on the Narmada Basin
at
http://www.mp.nic.in/nvda/history.htm. (explaining how the Narmada project
came to being). This is the web site of the Narmada Valley Development
Authority, Government of Madhya Pradesh.
13. The States included the three riparian states including Gujarat, Madhya
Pradesh (M.P.), Maharashtra, and the non-riparian state of Rajasthan. Recently, the
state of M.P. has been split into two states - MP. and Chattisgadh.

2001]

NARtADA VALLEY

1599

projects will result in a mass displacement of people, the majority
consisting of tribals, and severe environmental impacts. Serious
doubts have been raised about the quantum and equitable distribution
of the benefits, and the overall economic and financial viability of
the projects. 4
Since 1985, the people of the Valley have waged an intense
struggle under the name of the Narmada Bachao Andolan ("NBA"),
the Struggle to Save the Narmada. The battle began in 1985 as an
organization of the people affected by the Sardar Sarovar project."
Over the years, the people affected by other dams in the Valley have
also joined the organization including those from the Bargi, the Goi,
Indira Sagar, Jobat, Maheshwar, Man, Omkareshwar, Tawa and
6
Veda projects. 1

14. This essay is also not meant to be a critique of the Narmada Valley
projects. See generally Friends of Narmada at http://www.nannada.org (compiling
information on the social, environmental, and economic impact of constructing
large dams on the Narmada River).
15. The term "affected" people will be used generally. but includes "people to
be affected."
16. In the areas affected by the Sardar Sarovar, other groups have also been
working with some of the affected villages in Gujarat. such as the ARCH Vahini.
In M.P. and Maharashtra, other groups are also working within some of the
affected villages. For instance, in M.P., Khedut Majdoor Chetna Sangathan works
in some Sardar Sarovar affected villages: Tawa Bandh Visthapit Sangh works in
some Tawa affected villages; and in Maharashtra, the Punarvasan Sangharsh
Samiti works in the resettlement sites of Sardar Sarovar. However, these
organizations have been working in close collaboration with the Narmada Bachao
Andolan, except for a few of them, such as the ARCH Vahim, which differs in
perspective from the NBA. The Narmada Bachao Andolan remains the most
widespread and active organization and movement in the Valley.
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TABLE 1 : LARGE DAMS IN THE NARMADA
SR.

NAME

No.

PROJECT

OF

THE

VALLEY 7

ESTI-

PROPOSED

INSTALLED

STATUS/

MATED

COMMAND

CAPACITY

REMARKS

COST

AREA

(IN

LAKH'

(IN
CRORE'

8

(IN

MW)

9

HECTARES)

RUPEES)

1

Upper Narmada

58.55

2

Raghavpur

26.64

20

3

Rosra

32

35

4

Singarpur

165.72

60

5

Upper Budhner

59.80

0.0949

6

Halon

45

0.1173

30

0.1011

7

0.1280

Partly
Completed/

Dam

Matiyari

completed/

Reservoir
filled
8

Only

Bargi

dam

completed /
Reservoir
filled

A. Left Bank Canal

565.60

B.Bargi Diversion

995.20

90

In progress

4.3700

17. See Samagra Vikas, Narmada Valley Development Authority, Bhopal,
1997 (providing the statistics for the table below with the exception of Sardar
Sarovar). The cost estimates are hopelessly outdated and undervalued.
18.

Crore indicates ten million.

19.

Lakh signifies one hundred thousand.
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OF

THE

ESTI-

PROPOSED

INSTALLED

STATUS!

MATED

COMMAND

CAPACITY

REMARKS

COST

AREA

(IN

MW)

LAKH"'

(IN
CRORE'

(IN

8

HECTARES)

RUPEES)

9

Ataria

30.16

0.1295

10

Chinki

76.57

0.7082

11

Sher

12

Macharewa

93.23

0.6476

13

Shakker

14

Sitarewa

4.00

15

Dudhi

42.36

0.5060

16

Barna

18.90

0.5480

Completed

17

Tawa

113.00

2.4690

Completed

18

Kolar

120.00

0.4510

Partly
Completed/
Dam
Completed
Reservoir
filled

19

Morand

64.10

0.4800

20

Ganjal

21
22

Sukta
Punasa Lift

12.60
572.98

0.1660
0.3230

23

Indira Sagar

2167.67

1.14100

1000

In Progress

24

Omkareshwar

788.03

1.2900

520

In Progress

15

Completed
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ESTI-

PROPOSED

INSTALLED

STATUS/

MATED

COMMAND

CAPACITY

REMARKS

COST

AREA

(IN

LAKH'

(IN
CRORE'

8

(IN

MW)

9

HECTARES)

RUPEES)

25

Maheshwar

465.63

26

Upper Veda

20.48

0.1090

27

Maan

44.10

0.1500

28

Lower Goi

22.79

0.1370

29

Jobat

30.75

0.0985

30

Sardar

Sarovar 21

400

18

In Progress

In Progress

In Progress
1400

In Progress

III. WCD AND THE NARMADA VALLEY PROJECT
The Narmada Valley projects provide a rich example that
facilitates studying the implementation of the WCD for several
reasons. The projects span an entire basin quite large in size,
approximately 100,000 km2 . The projects encompass every size
ranging from the mega dams to the micro dams. Projects include
irrigation, hydro, water supply, and multipurpose schemes. Some of
the projects are completed, some ongoing, and some are still on the
drawing boards. The projects include those that are publicly owned
and developed as well as the private BOOT type. 2' A fair amount of
information is available in the public domain on these projects
(thanks largely to the popular struggle's concerted campaign). Lastly,
there is a basin-wide peoples' struggle in the Narmada Bachao
Andolan.
We will now directly look at what the WCD Report implies for the
20. The thirtieth large dam project, Sardar Sarovar, is in Gujarat. All of the
remaining projects are in M.P.
21. BOOT Contracts are "Build Own Operate Transfer" agreements.
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Narmada Valley. Part II of the Report, titled "The Jfay Forward,"
covers its recommendations for water and energy resource
planning.22 Chapter 7, "Enhancing Human Development," provides
the framework on which the WCD bases its way forward, and also
describes the framework's origin. 3 Chapter 8 "Strategic PrioritiesA New Policy Frameworkfor the Development of Water and Energy
Resources" is a crucial chapter that gives the seven strategic
priorities ("SPs") which the Commission believes should guide all
future water and energy resource development. Each SP is set forth
with a "Key Message" and accompanying "Policy Principles"
("PPs") which map out how the SPs may be realized in practice.
Each SP is also accompanied by a "Rationale" for the SP. 4
Chapter 9 provides detailed Guidelines and Checklist Criteria for
achieving the SPs. These checklists and guidelines correspond to five
stages of the project planning from Needs Assessment to Project
Completion and Operation.2 Of particular importance is the section titled ".4 Special Case:
Dams in Pipeline" in Chapter 9. We will focus only on the major
actions that need to be undertaken to implement the WCD Report in
the Narmada Valley.
A. SEVEN STRATEGIC PRIORITIES AND THE ACTIONS

The Seven Strategic Priories of the WCD Report include the
following:
Gaining Public Acceptance:
Comprehensive Options Assessment:
Addressing Existing Dams;
Sustaining Rivers and Livelihoods;
Recognizing Entitlements and Sharing Benefits:
Ensuring Compliance;

22. See WCD REPORT, supra note 5, at 195.

23. See id. at 213.
24. See id. at 213.
25. See id. at 259.
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6
Sharing Rivers for Peace, Development and Security.2
The Report recommends certain specific actions to achieve these
strategic priorities. From the SPs and the PPs given in the Report, we
can summarize, under various SPs, the following major actions
necessary for the implementation of the Report's recommendations.

1. SP 1: Gaining PublicAcceptance2
Implementation of this Report would require a process by which
all stakeholders are identified and a Stakeholder Forum ("SF") is
formed. This SF would then be given all the information about the
projects and would discuss and negotiate key decisions on the
projects. The process has to result in demonstrable acceptance of key
decisions. In particular, tribal people, who constitute a significant
portion of the people in the Valley, would have to give their free,
prior, and informed consent to the specific projects.
2. SP 2: Comprehensive Options Assessment ",
The SF would have to assess the needs that the projects seek to
meet. This is an inversion of the normal process whereby the project
planning starts, not by looking at the needs, but by looking at where
the suitable dam sites are and determining how to maximize the
amount of water that can be impounded. The SF would then have to
examine alternative means of achieving these needs, as well as the
alternative means by which the water and energy resources of the
Valley can be utilized. Of particular importance is Policy Principle
2.4, which states that "planning must give priority to making existing
water, irrigation, and energy systems more effective and sustainable
before taking a decision on a new projects. ' 29 There are already a
number of "completed" projects in the Narmada Valley that are

26. Id. at 305.
27. See id. at 215. It would be useful for readers to examine at the WCD Report
and, in particular, Chapter 8 discussing the Strategic Priorities and the Policy
Principles. For the want of space, this essay does not list all the PPs here.
28, See WCD REPORT, supra note 5, at 221 (arguing for a comprehensive
assessment of alternatives to dams).
29. Id. at 224.
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vastly under-performing. Priority in the options assessment will have
to be given in making full use of these projects. Possibilities are open
that a dam may or may not be the chosen option.
3. SP 3: Addressing Existing Dams"'
This SP requires introducing proper monitoring and evaluation
processes for existing dams in which all stakeholders are represented.
Existing dams are also evaluated for performance and any underutilized or unrealized potential is the first priority. People displaced
by existing dams who are not resettled need to be resettled. The
environmental impacts of existing dams need to be identified and
addressed. Both of these are of major importance in the Narmada
basin since there is a legacy of displacement and unresolved
environmental problems due to existing dams.
4. SP 4: SustainingRivers and Livelihoods"
The requirement of this SP is to assess the basin-wide study of the
ecology, economy, and culture, with emphasis on the linkages across
the basin. This introduces the very important criteria for evaluating
any option, namely that of prioritizing the need to avoid impact in
the framework of a precautionary approach.'2 It also requires
examination of the need to maintain minimum downstream flows. To
meet this requirement, the operation of all the existing dams in the
Valley must be reworked. New dams (if agreed upon through the
process of options assessment) should have this sustainability
approach incorporated into their design. This recommendation is
particularly relevant for the Sardar Sarovar dam, which is the
terminal project in the Narmada Valley, about 150 kilometers from
the mouth of the river.
30. See id. at 225.
31. See id. at 234 (suggesting that it is necessary to preserve rivers, watersheds,
and their ecosystems).
32. See Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, U.N. Conference
on Environment and Development, Principle 15 U.N. Doc. A CONF. 151 5 Rev. 1
(1992), reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 874 (1992) (describing the need to prevent
environmental damage, even when the exact extent of the damage is scientifically
uncertain).
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5. SP 5 : Recognizing Entitlements and Sharing Benefits3"
This SP requires that every person affected by any part of the
project be considered as the "Project Affected People," not just those
affected by submergence. The resettlement packages are to be
negotiated and formally agreed upon by the affected people, and are
to be legally binding. Affected people should also have the first
rights to project benefits.
6. SP 6 : Ensuring Compliance
This SP requires a compliance plan with pre-established criteria be
laid down in advance. The compliance monitoring has to be done
transparently by an independent agency. The last SP refers to
transboundary rivers and is not immediately relevant in the case of
the Narmada Valley.
B. SPECIAL CASE: DAMS IN THE PIPELINE

A criticism of the NVDP is that the project has been in progress
for many years. Introducing the above steps would cause a
fundamental re-opening of all the projects, undoing years of
planning. The WCD itself has taken into consideration such cases,
and has a separate section in Chapter 9, titled "A Special Case: Dams
in the Pipeline." The following quotes from this section are relevant
here:
Currently a large number of dam projects are at various stages of planning
and development. While acknowledging that delays in implementation
can cause unacceptable delays in delivering intended benefits, the WCD
Knowledge Base has demonstrated that it is never too late to improve
outcomes. On this basis, the Commission proposes an open and
participatory review of ongoing and planned projects to ascertain the
extent to which project formulation
can be adapted to accommodate the
34
principles outlined in this report.

33. See WCD REPORT, supra note 5, at 240 (arguing on behalf of the
recognition of affected person's rights to benefit from the projects).
34. Id.
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Stakeholder groups should have an opportunity to define the scope of the
review and to propose changes in keeping with the Commission's
35
recommendations.

This requires that the SF carry out a comprehensive exercise, first
agreeing to and defining the scope of the review, and then actually
carrying out the review of ongoing and planned projects.

IV. OUTCOMES OF THE IMPLEMENTATION
The above process, taken together, would be nothing short of a
fundamental revisit of the entire NVDP. It not only means a
comprehensive review of development of the Valley, including
ongoing projects, but it also involves a radical re-balancing of the say
that various groups have in the process, and the redefining of the
criteria for evaluation of alternatives. It is precisely these possibilities
that have led the Indian Dam establishment to vehemently and
furiously rise in condemnation of the Report.
However, there are several important issues that need to be
examined: Is the WCD Report advocating something entirely new
for the Valley? How would the scenarios in the Narmada Valley
materialize if the above process is actually carried out? Would the
results be positive or negative? How valid do the criticisms of the
Report turn out during the entire process'?
Interestingly, several initiatives have begun in the Narmada Valley
that cover many of the WCD Report recommendations. Most of the
initiatives are the result of the people's struggle in the Valley, and
none have reached a logical conclusion. Yet, these initiatives are
important from two perspectives. First, these initiatives reveal what
the implementation of the Report would look like. Second, the
initiatives demonstrate that the Report's recommendations are not a
grand conspiracy of the developed countries to stop dam building in
developing countries. The recommendations have not originated in
the Western world. Rather, many are rooted in experiments and
practice in countries such as India.
The following sections will examine two core initiatives: (1)the
35. Id.
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initiative in the Bargi Dam; and (2)the Task Force Process.
A. INITIATIVES IN BARGI

The Bargi dam is the first of the large dams on the Narmada main
stem to be completed. It is located near Jabalpur in M.P. The work
on the dam was initiated in the early seventies, and the filling of the
dam started in 1987. The huge reservoir of the dam affected 162
villages by submergence. It has an installed capacity of 90 MW and
proposed irrigation of 4.37 lakh hectares. The canal network is not
even seven percent complete due to severe financial constraints.
There was no rehabilitation policy. Consequently, only those who
possessed legal title to land were paid some cash compensation. All
others were simply ignored. The cash compensation was too small
for the people to purchase alternative lands and there was massive
corruption in the distribution of the compensation. Most of the
people affected were tribals. Many people just moved up along the
slopes of the reservoir and continued to live there, but their
livelihoods were destroyed as the agricultural lands were submerged.
Many wound up in the slums of Jabalpur as manual laborers, while
others were swallowed up by the huge invisible pool of itinerant
labor.
In 1990, the affected people came together under the banner of
Narmada Bachao Andolan and launched a strong agitation for proper
rehabilitation. The struggle reached an intense peak when the people
occupied the exposed submergence land and declared that they
would not allow the reservoir to be filled.16 As the waters rose, large
numbers of people remained along the submergence land, and largescale arrests were ordered. At the end of the three-year struggle in
1993, the State Government called a meeting of the affected people
and the parties reached an agreement. The Government admitted that
the rehabilitation was not done, even though on paper resettlement
was complete. It also established a "Rehabilitation Committee"

36. The reservoir level normally decreases as water is released for power
generation and is normally at its lowest in the months just prior to the monsoon.
The reservoir then fills up as the monsoon rains bring in huge quantities of water.
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comprised of representatives of the affected people, NBA activists, 3'
and senior government officials. The Committee was to plan the
affected people's rehabilitation on the basis of the available natural
resources, land (mainly draw-down land), water, electricity, and
forests. A two-tiered Resettlement Committee was also appointed at
the State and District levels to operationalize the resettlement. One of
the first actions taken was to stop the auction of the rights to
reservoir fisheries. These rights were granted to a co-operative of the
affected people. The affected people have now been running the
reservoir fisheries for the last eight years, which has provided the
people some much needed economic relief.
The progress on other fronts, especially efforts to provide landbased economic activity, remains dismal." Those who were affected
by the Tawa dam,39 a project completed over twenty years ago, found
encouragement in the struggle of the Bargi people and also launched
a struggle for similar rehabilitation."' The government in this
situation also agreed to grant the reservoir fisheries to the affected
people's organization. However, the progress on other avenues of
relief remains dismal.
The significance of this process lies in that it is similar to one of
the WCD's key recommendations, which requires the resolution of
outstanding social and environmental issues of existing dams with
the affected people's participation. Note that this took place years
before the formation of the WCD. There is a significant difference,
however, as the WCD said that "[p]riority must be given to financing
a negotiated reparation plan before funding new dam projects in a
specific location or river basin in a country."'
37. This author was a Committee member.
38. This essay is not intended to discuss, in depth, the reasons for this, but it
should be mentioned that bureaucratic apathy and the casual approach to

rehabilitation are largely responsible.
39. The Tawa dam was the first large dam to be completed in the Narmada

Valley. It is near the city of Hoshangabad, on the tributary of the Narmada of the
same name.
40. The people affected by the Tawa dam had been raising the issue of their
proper rehabilitation since their displacement. The Bargi experience gave a fillip to

their struggle.
41. See WCD REPORT, supra note 5. at 230 (discussing the financing of
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This was not only intended to ensure that the necessary finances
would be available to address outstanding issues, but clearly, such an
arrangement would place strong pressure on the government to
undertake the remedial actions in a timely and purposeful manner.
While this has also been the demand of the Narmada Bachao
Andolan, it is one that the government has not accepted. As a result,
while thousands of people displaced for nearly two decades still
anguish, the government moves forward with the building of other
dams in the Valley, which further displaces additional people and
exacerbates the problem.
B. THE TASK FORCE PROCESS
The Narmada Bachao Andolan, which began its work in the areas
affected by the Sardar Sarovar project, has spread to other parts of
the Valley, especially after 1995. With the emergence of a valleywide struggle, the NBA was able to give teeth to its long-standing
demand that the planning of development in the valley must be done
in a participatory manner with the river basin as a unit. Responding
to the pressure of the struggle, in December 1997, the M.P.
Government held a unique workshop entitled "Narmada Valley
Development--Search for Alternatives." The participants included
the NBA (with people affected by nine major dams in the Valley),
energy and water management experts from different parts of the
country, senior M.P. government officials, the Chief Minister, and
the Deputy Chief Minister (who was also the minister for Narmada
Development). After two days of deliberations, the workshop
reached the following conclusion:
The projects under the Narmada Valley Development Authority have
been prepared under earlier circumstance and an older paradigm of
development. There is a need for a review of these under the changed
circumstances and paradigm of today... A task force will be constituted
to discuss in detail and make recommendations to the Government about
the broad framework of alternatives which will include the alternative
42
model of development also.

reparations and compensation).
42. Shripad Dharmadhikary, The Quest for Alternatives in the Narmada Valley,
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The Task Force, however, formed only after a massive agitation
where 4000 people occupied the Maheshwar dam site for twenty
days in January 1998." 3 Finally, the Task Force was created by a
Government Order dated January 29, 1998. The order stated,
"[L]ooking at the size, nature and complexities of the present
problems of the Narmada Valley Development a Task Force will be
constituted to look into the alternatives to the Narmada Valley
Projects." 4
The Task Force consisted of independent experts, senior
government officials, and NBA representatives .4 - NBA put as a precondition that the government make available all information related
to the projects, including the general situation of the Valley:
topographical, geological, agricultural, demographic aspects,
statistics, and maps. The government agreed to this and, for the first
time, the people of the Valley gained access to the detailed project
reports ("DPRs") and other related studies of the various projects in
the Valley. This is significant because most of the projects were
finalized in the 1960s, but remained unimplemented even in 1998.
The Task Force meetings would be spread over two periods, three
days at a time, and involved the critical analysis of individual
projects and detailed discussions of alternatives, as well as other
broader issues. The affected people's participation was vigorous and
at http://wwv.humanscapeindia.org/hs/0200/hs2OOl5t.htm (n.d.). The Narmada
Valley Development Authority is an authority created by the Government of M.P.
to undertake all the development work in the Narmada Valley related to the
planning and building of dams.
43. See Task Force to Study Narmada Valley Development Options. Task
Force Report on Narmada Valley Projects. Narmada Bachao Andolan. at
http://wxv.narmada.org/maheshwar/docs/Book.html-altematives, at pam. 3 (Oct.
15, 1998) [hereinafter Report on Narmada Valley Protects] (noting that the process
of constituting the Task Force moved ahead only after protests by NBA). Such
intransigence, roadblocks, back tracking, and reluctance dogged the entire process
of the Task Force and continued during the implementation of its report.
44. Order No. 12-1-112-27-2-97/104 under Narmada Valley Development
Department Ministry of Madyha Pradesh, Bhopal. Jan. 29, 1998 at
http://wwwv.narmada.org/maheshwar/docs/Book.html#altematives (last ,isited June
17, 2001). The Task Force looked into all projects and aspects of the Narmada
Valley Development, excluding the Sarovar project, because it involved more than
one state.
45. This author participated as a member of the Task Force.
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in-depth. The Task Force completed its work in approximately ten
months.46
The Task Force considered the issues in two parts. First, the Task
Force looked at the entire Narmada Valley Development, including
all the proposed and ongoing projects, in a bid to critically analyze
the situation and consider alternatives. Second, the M.P. government
requested a deliberation and report on the Maheshwar Project on a
priority basis. This was in view of the intense agitation that was
going on in the Maheshwar-affected area, and the fact that the
Maheshwar project was being implemented by a private company on
a BOOT basis, under a contractual agreement.47
The Task Force process can be described as a rudimentary form of
the SF-based decision-making process that the WCD has
recommended.48 It was also a form of the process recommended by
the WCD in its "Special Case: Dams in the Pipeline," where it called
for the SF to conduct "an open and participatory review of ongoing
and planned projects to ascertain the extent to which project
formulation can be adapted to accommodate the principles outlined
in this report."49 It is significant that the principles on which the Task
Force based its deliberations strongly resembled those accepted by
the WCD in forming its basic framework.
The Task Force differs primarily from the WCD SF in its
authority. The Task Force was a purely advisory body whose
recommendations were not binding and did not have any powers
beyond moral authority.

46. It may be noted that the Task Force began its discussion before the WCD
had come into existence and had submitted its report before the WCD began its
work.
47. See Task Force to Study Narmada Valley Development Option, Task Force
Report on Maheshwar Hydro Electric Project, Narmada Bachao Andolan, at
http://www.narmada.org/maheshwar/docs/Book.html#alternatives,
at para. 4.0
(Oct. 15, 1998) [hereinafter MAHESHWAR REPORT]; see also supra note 21 for a
description of BOOT Contracts.
48. See WCD REPORT, supra note 5, at 211 (recommending "a decisionmaking process based on the pursuit of negotiated outcomes, conducted in an open
and transparent manner and inclusive of all legitimate actors involved in the
issue.") availableat http://www.damgs.org (last visited June 17, 2001).
49. Id. at 276.
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1. Findingsand Recommendations of the Task Force
The findings and recommendations of the Task Force provide a
reasonably accurate picture of what the WCD Report implementation
would look like in the Valley. Below are some of the important
findings, observations, and recommendations of the Task Force:
a. Task Force Report on Maheshwar Hydro Electric Project
Conclusions and Recommendations[:]

The Task Force recommends that the following steps be taken be/ore
considering resumption of work of Maheshwar project: Cost-benefit

analysis be computed again on the lines suggested above; if the fresh
computations also shows greaterbenefits than cost, a comprehensive plan
for rehabilitation programme strictly following the rehabilitation policy as
demanded by the Government of M.P. for Sardar Sarovar from the
Government of Gujarat be prepared in a participatory manner...; this
comprehensive plan should specifically indicate the ftasibiliny of R&R
[Resettlement and Rehabilitation ] ... particularly availability of land for
allotment to the oustees and resettlement of the villages as communities;
implementation should be initiated if the model R&R plan is lbund
feasible implementation be implemented.5 t'

The Task Force Report enumerates the criticisms of the project
(made with extensive documentation and support), particularly the
social, environmental, economic, and financial costs. It emphasizes
that the cost of power is going to be very high.5' It also lists the
various alternatives proposed for the project. It then observes:

50. See MAHESHWAR REPORT, supra note 47, at para 4.0 (emphasis added).
The Government's failure to publish the Report of the Task Force exemplifies how
the Government developed cold feet on the Task Force process. In the presence of
key NBA activists, including this writer, the Task Force Chairperson submitted the
Report (labeled a "Brief Report") to the Chief Minister on January 14, 2000. At
that time, the Chairperson stated that a "final" Report would be produced with all
the Annexures. Yet, it has not materialized. Because the Government has not
published the Report of the Task Force, the NBA finally decided to go ahead and
publish it. Hence, the report is only available through Narmada Backao Andolan
on its website (,vww.narmada.org) and not through the Government.
51. See id. atpara. 2.1.
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We are happy to report that the task force was quite excited about many
non-conventional sources of energy that have not been tried in the State in
the scale it is feasible. . .The Task Force is convinced that there is
considerable scope in this area, definite that a amount of substantial work
can be done in this field given the necessary commitment.
The need to workout afresh the cost-benefit in the framework presented in
an earlier chapter is considered desirable and is recommended by the Task
Force, as an exercise to be undertaken by the MPEB52 . . .We therefore
strongly recommend that the Government of M.P. evolve an effective
mechanism to monitor and ensure compliance with the conditions of the
project, refusing to leave it executing agency to report a formal
53
compliance.
The Task Force was of the view... [Government should] strictly adhere
to the same conditions for [rehabilitation of affected people in]
Maheshwar and other projects as we demand of Gujarat Government with
respect to Sardar Sarovar.
I. Giving land for land...
2. Settling the village as a community...;
3. [C]omplete rehabilitation plan well in advance of taking up
construction ... ;
4. Satisfactory re-settlement to be complete54before December 3 1, in the
year preceding the year of... submergence.

It is clear from the information above that the Task Force's
examination raised serious doubts about the cost and expected
benefits of the Maheshwar project, which the State touted as cheap,
clean, and indispensable. The Task Force recommended a full reworking revision of the cost-benefit ratio ("C/B") of the project,
giving priority to social and environmental criteria. The Task Force
also recommended that the project proceed only ifthe C/B is positive
and the rehabilitation plan is feasible.? Thus, the process yielded the
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. See MAHESHWAR

REPORT,

supra note 47, at para. 2.1.
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benefit of identifying a potentially unworthwhile project and
weeding it out. This process can only have a net positive benefit,
even if it results in the cancellation of a dam project.
These recommendations cast serious doubt on the viability and
desirability of the project. Midway through the process, the
government appeared to develop cold feet on the Task Force. Upon
considering the recommendations, the government seemed to lose all
motivation to proceed (perhaps because of the influence of vested
interests) and it did not accept the recommendations.:"
b. Task Force Report on Narmada Valley Projects
The Task Force Report on the Narmada Valley provided more
detail and dealt with issues such as the development paradigm,
specific alternatives in terms of institutions, technologies,
approaches, and social and environmental criteria. " We summarize
below some of the key findings of the Task Force:
The Task Force noted that serious doubts now exist about the
efficacy of centralized planning based on the outdated western
paradigm of development.x
The purpose [of the Task Force] was to move away from minor specific
localized strifes to a rational participatory reassessment, generally, of the
basic issues in planning and development and more specifically in the
area of water resources management and to evolve a new vision - an
alternative paradigm of development and a fresh approach to the planning
process 59. . .A close examination, today, of the existing master plan for
the development of the Narmada Valley highlights the radical change that
has occurred in the approach to the water resources development in the
60
past three decades.

The Task Force concluded that the largely financial and economic
cost-benefit analysis formed the main criteria for project selection in

56. See supra text accompanying note 23.
57. See Report on Narmada Valley Projects,supra note 43.
58. See id. at para. 5.
59. Id. at para. 2
60. Id. at para. 7.
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the earlier approach, while social and environmental considerations,
social displacement, psychological trauma, equity, and sustainable
use of natural resources were not major considerations.6
The Task Force not only concluded that these considerations must
now play a decisive role, but also said that the limitations imposed
by "societal and administrative capacity," especially with regard to
resettlement of displaced people, must determine the scales and
locations of projects, along with other parameters.62
The Task Force recommended that the water utilization begin at
the uppermost points of the catchments with decentralized small
schemes and watershed development.63 Medium and large dams, if
required for the storage of "residual surpluses," would be used
"albeit with relatively smaller storage capacities" and smaller
submergence." 4 Only those projects that are capable of fully
complying with resettlement and environmental norms should be
initiated. Clearly, this raises serious doubts about the implementation
of many of the ongoing or planned projects in the Narmada Valley.
The Task Force recommended a re-examination of many of these
projects. It stated, in part, that "the Task Force emphasizes that due
to the problems of human displacement, the trauma of social
dislocation and psychological stress, the realistic limitations in
finding adequate land for rehabilitation

.

.

.

it is becoming

exceedingly difficult to establish the economic feasibility or social
justifiability of the large and medium projects."65
The Task Force discussed issues such as decentralized planning
and watershed development, noting that current efforts were "ad hoc,
sporadic, and unscientific. 66 It made several recommendations for
making efforts more effective and holistic.

67

The Task Force recommended that the Goi River sub-basin, a
61. See id. at para. 8(iv).
62. Id. at para. 1 (i).
63. See Report on Narmada Valley Projects,supra note 43, at para. 3.

64. Id. at para. 14.
65. Id. at para. 15
66. Id. at para. 22 (emphasis added).
67. See id. at para. 35 19-24.
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tributary of Narmada that has a total area of 215 000 hectares, be
used to test the new paradigm.6
2. Indira Sarovar (NarmadaSagar Projectf"
A complete review of the economic viability of the ISP should be
undertaken, and fresh benefit-cost ratio derived after quantifying all the
7
realistic human, social and environmental CoStS. "

It is necessary to analyze and ascertain the extent to which human trauma
can be reduced at different heights (FRL) of the dams, retaining its
present nature of a multipurpose project. Similarly, it is necessary to find
out the maximum
required height of ISP, if it is envisaged only as a
71
power project.

C. ENERGY AND POWER

The Task Force stressed the need to evaluate and carefully
distinguish between basic survival needs and lesser priorities,
prioritize the demands, and address the issue of demand
justification.7 2 The Task Force also noted that improvement in the
efficiency of existing capacity can meet a portion of the supplydemand gap.73 The Task Force called for an integrated resource plan
for the energy and power sectors, including supply-side measures,
demand-side measures, and the harnessing of non-conventional and
renewable resources. It listed a number of technologies which could
be used to meet energy demands and emphasized the need to use
68. Report on Narmnada Valley Projects. supra note 43, at para. 25 (agreeing
that the proposed Lower Goi and Upper Veda projects (two out of the thirty large
dams in the Valley) would be suspended and the alternative approach would be
implemented in these areas). As with other recommendations of the Task Force,
this too lies unimplemented. See id.
69. The Narmada Sagar project is gigantic and the biggest in the Valley. If it is
completed, it will have the largest man-made reservoir in the country.
70. Report on Narmada Valley Projects,supra note 43. at para. 35(iv).
71. Id.
72. See id. at para. 39.
73. See id. at para. 40.
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these alternatives as options.74
Some of the options recommended by the Task Force include
"options for restructuring the existing or planned projects to get more
out of them such as installing 180 MW additional capacity at Bargi
dam- where the social and environmental costs have already been
paid."75
The Task Force also stated that even after all these considerations,
if there is still a need for a large conventional hydro project,
The planning, selection, choice, location, and execution of such projects
should be based on a fresh cost-benefit analysis with the new parameters
suggested by the task force and only if they are found to be viable and
acceptable from all these angles, they should be implemented avoiding, to
the maximum extent possible, displacement and trauma.76

The Task Force recommended a people-oriented, transparent,
public commission to oversee implementation of all this.77 The Task
Force finally concluded that "[p]hasing out the finite and expensive
resources of energy which carry a high socio-environmental cost
78
burden, should be the accepted policy.

V. LESSONS FROM TASK FORCE REPORT AND
CRITCISM OF THE WCD REPORT
It is clear that the process of participatory review of existing dams
has revealed an outdated basis of planning and a need to critically
evaluate the social and environmental costs and review the costbenefit ratio of these projects. The process has shown that most of
the major ongoing and planned projects are unlikely to meet the
social and environmental criteria, and a number of alternatives are
available that would better implement the Task Force's
recommendations. Indeed, while the Task Force found that there may

74. See id. at para. 43.
75. Id. at para. 47.
76. Report on Narmada Valley Projects, supra note 43, at para. 51.
77. See id. at para. 53.
78. Id. at para. 54.
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be a need for undertaking large dams projects in the Valley, this need
must be establishedfirst; even after this, these projects can go ahead
only if the social and environmental aspects can be addressed, and
even then "albeit with relatively smaller storage capacities for
impounding residual surpluses."7
The Task Force findings are dramatic, and strongly reinforce the
later WCD recommendations. We now examine the criticisms of the
WCD Report in light of the above scenario. The Task Force process
certainly shows that if the WCD recommendations are implemented,
they will indeed lead to radical restructuring of current plans and
could even lead to many large dam projects being dropped. This is
not as bad as the Indian dam establishment purports it to be. After
all, what the Task Force process shows is that dam projects would
need to be reexamined where the C/B ratio is in doubt, leading to a
net benefit, as dams with adverse C/B ratios are dropped. It also
shows that dams with adverse social and environmental impacts
would have to be abandoned, especially if the avoidance or
mitigation of such adverse consequences is not possible. This is by
no means an undesirable result. Lastly, and most importantly, this
process has shown that there are a large number of alternatives
available and a re-examination along the lines suggested by the
WCD will open up space for these alternatives to be implemented."
The Bargi experience demonstrates that it is imperative to address
outstanding social and environmental issues on a priority basis. The
construction of new projects must be conditional on this. Dam
proponents will argue that this will open up a Pandora's box and
constrain new development due to a huge backlog of outstanding
issues. Practically every dam in India would have a legacy of people
displaced without resettlement. This argument, however, is not
tenable for the simple reason that addressing outstanding social
issues, especially resettlement of people displaced decades ago, is a
matter of justice. It is a matter of restoring to people their
fundamental rights. If this necessitates a slowdown of new dam
construction, then a slowdown must be accepted. In fact, the dam79. Id. at para. 14.
80. See WCD REPORT, supra note 5, at 221-24 (establishing guidelines fbr
undertaking a "Comprehensive Options Assessment").
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building establishment has proven that it responds only to this type
of pressure."'
In short, if the WCD recommendations are followed, the net result
would be the implementation of better alternatives and better dams.
It would result in delivering justice to those who have been suffering
for decades. Further, it would protect the environment and the
livelihoods of the lakhs who depend on the environment.
More importantly, the implementation
of the WCD
recommendations will result in a decisive shift in the balance of
power. People who, for centuries, have had little say in what happens
in their lives, will be able to meaningfully participate in decisions
affecting their lives. Technocrats, bureaucrats, and politicians who
have long enjoyed absolute power will find their powers diminished.
This is the real reason for the vehement reaction to the WCD report
among the dam establishment. It is not the fear that development of
water and energy resources will come to a standstill because, as the
Task Force report has shown, that will not happen. It is also not a
concern that many beneficial projects will be abandoned, because
that will not occur. In fact, it is only substandard projects that will be
abandoned, resulting in a net benefit to India. It is the dam-building
establishment's fear of losing power and control over vast resources
that is their real concern. The WCD has recognized this very clearly
when its chair stated in the Preface that, "Our genesis, work process
and implications of this Final Report are by nature quite political.
Our mandate involves the most precious element on earth, and that,
of course, involves power: who wields it, how to share it, which
ways the state may better balance it."82
This statement reflects the reasons why the government that
initiated the Task Force Process developed cold feet and lost all
political will when the Task Force reached its logical conclusions.
The government refused to even publish the report, let alone
implement it.83 In the case of the Maheshwar Project, where a private
81. See supra text accompanying note 43.
82. Kader Asmal, Chair's Preface in Globalisation From Below, World
Commission on Dams, Dams and Development: A New Frameworkfor Decision-

Making, (Nov. 2000), at ii-iii (2000).
83. See supra text accompanying note 50.
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company is building the dam, the government unleashed inhumane
repression on the affected people who have continued to protest,
demanding the implementation of the Report."
As the WCD says: "Similarly the political economy of power,
vested interests and access to resources that characterize each society
have a large influence on its commitment to equitable and
sustainable development."8"
Let us take a look at two strong points of attack on the WCD
recommendations, criticisms which seem to state reasonable
concerns but are actually specious arguments. The first is that the
WCD recommendations are cumbersome and time-consuming, and
implementation of these recommendations will immeasurably delay
projects, causing financial agencies and the private sector to lose
interest. To quote from the Government of India's Ministry of Water
Resources ("MOWR") Detailed Response to the WCD:"'
Developing Nations such as India will certainly be concerned that such a
cumbersome negotiation process, with mediation steps. re'iew by expert
panels, and requiring all detailed information about the potential impact
on the ecosystem and the population, will, in fact, stall any new
development projects. The cumbersome nature of the process is further
complicated by the WCD recommendation to revisit the operational
parameters of a constructed dam with all stakeholder participation at the
end of each five-year period. This will add additional risk to project

84. In April 1999, the people of the Narmada Valley launched an intense
agitation in Bhopal, the capital of M.P. About 500 people affected by the various
large dams in the Valley sat for a month-long sit-in in Bhopal, demanding the
implementation of the Task Force Report. Seven of these also undertook an
indefinite fast that lasted twenty-two days. Finally, the Government agreed to
implement some of the recommendations and issued a Government Notification
for the same. In this notification too, the recommendations related to the
Maheshwar project were not accepted. The Government Notification and the
promises made by the Government, of course, remain unimplemented to date.
85. WCD REPORT, supra note 5, at 203.
86. Letter from Mr. A. Sekhar, Comm'r. Ministry of Water Resources,
Government of India, to Mr. Achim Steiner, Secretary-General, WCD (Feb. 2,
2001), available at http://genepi.louis-jean.com/cigb/lnde.htm. The detailed
response of the Government of India is placed on the ICOLD's website. This is in
the form of a note by the MOWR. The author is not aware of any other place
where the response has been published. The CD brought out by the WCD and the
WCD's web site itself carry only the brief response of the Government of India.
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development by developing Nations such as India. This document will
make it difficult for the financial institutions to support the new
programmes of developing countries; the result will be creating enormous
delays and increased costs of Projects for developing
Nations who may
87
have to find their own funding methodologies.

The WCD offers one answer to this. It notes that the
implementation of the recommendations may have some up-front
costs, both financial and in time, but ultimately the recommendations
will result in projects that are fundamentally sound, economically
viable, and more widely accepted by the public. Far less time,
money, and energy is likely to be lost in subsequent conflicts. The
result will be better projects involving less time and expense.
The Task Force process demonstrates that the process of
participatory, SF-based decision-making is more likely to involve
fewer conflicts and take less time than apprehended. The Task Force
completed its deliberations in ten months. The whole process proved
extremely cordial and without incident-a miracle considering that
the negotiating parties intensely conflicted outside the room.88 This
illustrates the obvious interest that all the parties had in conducting
the discussions. The Task Force also reached many unanimous
conclusions, a possibility that seemed very unlikely.
It is equally important to note that this time period is miniscule
compared to the gestation periods of large dam projects. In the case
of the Narmada Valley projects, the first surveys were initiated in
1946, nearlyfifty-five years ago. The first Detailed Project Reports
for the major schemes were prepared in 1959-1965, over thirty-five

87. See id.
88. Even as the Task Force sat and discussed, the people affected by the
Maheshwar project protested and the Government unleashed terrible repression violent police beating of women, unlawful arrests, intimidation - to the extent that
India's National Commission on Women intervened to condemn the same. The
reason for the protest was simple - when the Task Force was constituted, the
Government issued a notification dated January 30, 1998 staying all work on the
Maheshwar project until all parties had a chance to study the report submitted by
the Task Force. Suddenly, in the middle of the process, when barely a couple of
months had passed, the Government issued unilateral orders allowing the company
to re-start construction. Despite this development, the Task Force deliberations
continued.
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years ago. During the intervening fifty-five years from the first
surveys to today, the large dam projects in Narmada Valley have
resulted in the installation of ninety megawatt generating capacity,
and completion, or partial completion, of projects with planned
annual irrigation capacities of 706,216 hectares and an actual
irrigation of only thirty-five percent of this, some 245,939 hectares. "
This is the benefit after fifty-five years of planning: only ninety
megawatts and 245,939 hectares of irrigation!
Vast resources were spent in the process, thousands of hectares of
forests destroyed, and many people displaced. It should be noted that
such long gestation periods are not atypical of large dam projects.
Thus, it makes no difference that the WCD recommended SF takes
even two years to reach a decision. In fact, the Task Force report
showed that many of the alternatives could start delivering benefits
within a couple of years.
The second criticism is that the WCD recommendations are a
product of the "developed" countries, with standards inapplicable to
"developing countries" and to India in particular. The response of the
ICOLD to the WCD Report stated, "Based upon our world-wide
experience, we consider that the WCD detailed recommendations are
mostly designed for and based on the experience of developed
countries, which have the time and money to explore all possible
alternatives to dams and can afford, if they wish." '
The Task Force process, as well as the Bargi experience,
demonstrates that many of the important recommendations of the
WCD were already put in practice in Incia, albeit in a somewhat
89. Narmada Control Authority, Annual Water of Narmada Basin Up to Sardar
Sarovar Dam Site for Years 1991-92, 1992-93. 1995-96. The Narmada Control
Authority is a body consisting of representatives of the four state Governments and
the Central Government; this is the body that is charged vith implementation of
the Award of the Narmada Tribunal.
90. Letter from Shri C.V.J. Verma. President, Int'l Comm'n on Large Dams, to
Kader Asmal, Chairman, World Comm'n on Dams. (No%. 30, 2000). tivuilable at
http://www.dams.org/report/reaction-icold2.htm (last visited June 17, 2001). The
current President of the International Commission on Large Dams ("ICOLD"),
Shri C.V.J. Verma, is from India and one can safely presume that the Indian dambuilding establishment's views must have had significant influence on the ICOLD
position. Due to the similarity in the responses of ICOLD and the Government of
India, MOWR also points to this "shared response."
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different form. This implementation occurred even before the
formation of the WCD. The WCD recommendations have resulted
directly from its review of the global experience and the
internationally accepted norms of human rights. Since these are
common all over the world, it is to be expected that wherever a
genuine attempt is made to address the issues raised by large dams
based on an independent and open-minded assessment of past
experience, the conclusions for the future would be similar.
There are many areas in which the Indian institutions have put
forth recommendations similar to those of the WCD. The example of
the Task Force process is already given above. Another example, the
Narmada Water Disputes Tribunal Award, set forth conditions for
resettlement similar to the WCD norms. 9'
In 1993, the Government of India established a five-member group
to review the SSP. Among other things, this group recommended that
the definition of the "Project Affected People" should be expanded to
include not only the submergence-affected people, but also people
affected adversely in any manner whatsoever by the project, with
development of category-specific resettlement packages. 92 This is
similar to one of the WCD's key recommendations.
The value-addition by the WCD is that it has taken hundreds of
such initiatives from all over the world, not only from developed
countries, and put them together in a coherent and systematic
manner, to give a holistic framework instead of a piecemeal
approach. Indeed, the WCD is firmly rooted and based on sound
global experiences.

91. Compare Directors Regarding Submergence Land Acquisitions and
Rehabilitation of Displaced Persons, Final Order and Decision of the Narmada
Water Disputes Tribunal Award, at cl. XI (Dec. 12, 1979) (providing for land
compensation, non-land compensation, and civic amenities), available at
http://nca.nic.in/nwdtfinalorderdeci.htm (last visited June 17, 2001), with WCD
REPORT, supra note 48, at 109 (requiring several conditions such as "low level of
displacement, resettlement as development policy with supporting legislation, a
combination of land and non-land based sustainable livelihood provisions, strong
community participation and accountability and commitment from government and
project developers.").
92. It is another matter that the Project has not accepted this recommendation.
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VI. WCD FRAMEWORK, RECOMMENDATIONS,
AND LEGAL REGIME IN INDIA
A very significant aspects of the WCD Report is that its risks-andrights framework, core values, and seven strategic priorities (and
policy principles which elaborate these) are developed from
internationally-accepted frameworks of human rights and
environmental practices, namely United Nations resolutions and the
Rio Declaration.93
In India, it is a settled principle of law that international treaties
and covenants to which India is a signatory, as well as established
principles of international law, are to be read into the legal regime
and Fundamental Rights of citizens of India. As a part of the legal
submissions to the Supreme Court during the hearings of a case filed
by the Narmada Bachao Andolan, 4 Senior Counsel for the NBA and
former Law Minister of India, Shanti Bhushan, made the following
submission: 95
The Supreme Court has held in a large number of cases that international
treaties and covenants can be read into the domestic law of the country
and can be used by the courts to elucidate the interpretation of
fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution. In GraiaphoneCo. o
India Ltd. vs. B.B. Pandey this Court has held that:

There can be no question that nations must march with the international
community and the municipal law must respect rules of international law
even as nations respect international opinion. The comity of nations
requires that rules of international law may be accommodated in the

93. See U.N. Conference on Env't & Dev., Rio Declaration on Env't & Dev.,
U.N.Doc.A/Conf.151/5/Rev.1, at princ. 10 (1992) ("At the national level, each
individual shall have appropriate access to information concerning the
environment that is held by public authorities, including information on hazardous
materials and activities in their communities, and the opportunity to participate in
decision-making processes.") reprintedin 31 I.L.M. 874, 878 (1992).
94. Narmada BachaoAndolan v. Union of India & Others, 2000 SOL Case No.
587 (2000), available at http://www.supremecourtonline.com/cases/ l189.html
(visited June 12, 2001). The Writ Petition concerned the Sardar Sarovar Project.
95. See "Written Submissions on Behalf of Petitioners, Part I: Introduction and
Background," Feb. 2000; "Submission to Supreme Court on Behalf of NBA," Feb.
2000, in Writ Petition 319/1994.
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municipal law even without express legislative sanction provided they do
not run into conflict with acts of Parliament... The doctrine of
incorporation also recognises the position that the rules of international
law are incorporated into national law and considered to be part of the
national law, unless they are in conflict with an Act of Parliament ... But
the courts are under an obligation within legitimate limits, to so interpret
the municipal statute as to avoid confrontation with the comity of nations
96
or the well established principles of international law.
Further, in PUCL vs. Union of India, 97 this Court while dealing with the
applicability of the International Covenants on Civil and Political Rights
1966 held that "for the present it would suffice to state that the provisions
of the covenant, which elucidate and go to effectuate the fundamental
rights guaranteed by our Constitution, can certainly be relied upon by
Courts, as facets of those fundamental rights and hence enforceable as
such." 98
In CERC vs. Union of India,99 this Court directed that the rules framed by
the International Labour Organisation for Safety for the use of asbestos
shall be binding on the Government and all industries in the country. This
was also on the principle that international conventions can be read into
00
domestic law.1

While the Final Judgement and Order of the Court (Majority
Judgement) in this case dismissed the plea of the Petitioners for a
review of the Sardar Sarovar and ruled for a conditional continuation
of the project, it also observed that:
While accepting the legal proposition that International Treaties and
Covenants can be read into the domestic laws of the country the
submission of the respondents was that Article 12 of the ILO Convention
No. 107 stipulates that "[p]opulations concerned shall not be removed
without their free consent from their habitual territories except in
accordance with national laws and regulations relating to national
security, or in the interest of national economic development or of the

96.

1984 2 SCC, 534, para 5,

97.

1997 3 SCC, 433, para 13.

98. Id.
99.

1995 3 SCC, at 42, para 30.

100. Id.
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health of the said populations." 101

A reading of Chapter 7 of the WCD Report demonstrates that its
entire framework is drawn from internationally accepted declarations
or charters from the international framework on human rights.
Chapter 7 states that:
The UN Declaration of Human Rights, the Right to Development and the
Rio Principles together make up an internationally accepted framework of
norms empowering a concept of development that is economtcally viable,
socially equitable, and environmentally sustainable. It is a powerful
framework with a central bearing on the dams debate. Figure 7.1 of the
Report illustrates how the Commission draws on these internationally
accepted norms in the remainder of this report to develop a new policy
framework and corresponding guidance for water and energy resources
10 2
development.

True, these are not the same as covenants or treaties that countries
ratify, which are binding. Rather, these declarations and charters are
in the nature of declared intentions or internationally endorsed
statements of principles. These clearly form "well established
principles of international law. ''i °3 The WCD also relies upon
international conventions such as ILO 107 and ILO 169, the former
of which has been ratified and is binding on India."" Clearly, on the
basis of settled principles, these international declarations, treaties,
and charters can and would guide the elucidation of the domestic law
in the country, in particular the fundamental rights.""' Certainly, the
argument can be made that the specific guidelines, criteria and policy
101. Narmada Bachao Andolan v. Union of India & Others, 2000 SOL Case No.
587 (2000), available at http://www.supremecourtonline.coni cases, l189.htmi
(visited June 12, 2001) (emphasis added).
102. See WCD REPORT, supra note 5. at 202.
103. Id.
104. See Indigenous and Tribal Populations Convention, ILO No. 107 (1957)
(ratified
by
India
on
Jan.
29,
1958).
cvalhable
at
http://ilolex.ilo.ch: 1567/scripts/convde.pl?C 107.
105. The author is not a lawyer. However, the above legal argument is being
made on the basis of discussions with lawyers and familiarity with legal pnnciples
and interpretation resulting from involvement in the NBA Supreme Court case for
five years and significant experience with human rights work.

1628

AM. U. INT'L L. REV.

[16:1591

principles formulated by the WCD are one possible interpretation of
the international resolutions and covenants. Even if these were to be
read into Indian domestic law, it is not necessary that the WCD
interpretation be accepted. However, one needs to take into
consideration the nature of the WCD. The WCD is arguably the
optimal body to interpret the international declarations, covenants,
and treaties in terms of their application to dams. The WCD
consisted of extremely qualified members and represented all sides
of the dams debate. These members, after two years of intense study
and consultations, formulated unanimous recommendations. One
cannot find a better agency to accomplish what they did, and
certainly not one that carries more legitimacy in the eyes of all
sections and stakeholders.
Thus, the argument that the WCD recommendations originate
from somewhere in the Western world is without merit. The WCD
recommendations arguably represent the fundamental rights of the
Indian citizens guaranteed by the Constitution, with the incorporation
of the principles of international treaties, resolutions, and covenants
interpreted in the context of dams by a competent technical body. 1)6
In many cases, Indian domestic law is also moving in the
directions indicated by the WCD, though independently of the WCD.
For example, the provisions of the Panchayat Extension to the
Scheduled Areas Act, 1996 indicate that Parliamentary policy is
moving towards an "informed consent" policy for the scheduled, or
tribal, areas."7 Section 4, Clause (I) of the Act states:
Notwithstanding anything contained under Part IX of the Constitution, the
Legislature of a State shall not make any law under that Part which is
inconsistent with any of the following features namely...

106. The word "technical" is not used here in the narrow sense of engineering,
but in the sense of an expert body pertaining to the "technique" of dams, including
the social, environmental, and financial aspects.
107. The Provisions of the Panchayats (Extension to the Scheduled Areas) Act
(1996), Order No. 40 of 1996 under the National Commission for Scheduled
Castes and Scheduled Tribes, 24 Dec. 1996 [hereinafter Panchayats Act], available
at http://ncscst.nic.in/panchayats.htm.
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(i) The Gram Sabha 0 8 or the Panchayatsi(N at the appropnate level shall
be consulted before making the acquisition of land in the Scheduled Areas
for development projects and before re-settling or rehabilitating persons
affected by such projects in the Scheduled Areas; the actual planning and
implementation of the projects in the Scheduled Areas shall be
coordinated at the State level.")

International and Indian experience with environmental law,
human rights legislation, and developmental law all show that the
actual codification of experience and good practice into laws is
probably ten to fifteen years behind ground experience. The WCD
Report offers a chance to shorten this time, by drawing upon global
experiences of water and energy resource development planning in a
systematic and holistic manner. In fact, the principles enunciated in
the WCD Report go beyond dams and are relevant for other areas of
development planning as well.

CONCLUSIONS
The initiatives in the Narmada Valley, including the Task Force
process and the Bargi process, in many ways parallel the
recommendations of the WCD. Therefore, these initiatives allow the
opportunity to see how the implementation of the WCD
recommendations would be executed. The experience of these
initiatives reveals that proper implementation of the WCD
recommendations would have an immensely positive impact on
water and energy development. Implementation of the WCD
recommendations would eliminate inferior projects and improve
beneficial projects by making them more just, equitable, and
sustainable. In the long run, WCD recommendations would make
projects less expensive and more acceptable, creating space to
implement alternatives to large dams. The initiatives in the Narmada
Valley also belie the argument that the WCD recommendations
emerge from the Western or "developed" countries and are not
suitable for "developing" countries. In fact, the WCD
108. The Gram Sabha consists of the total adult population of the village.
109. Panchayat is the elected governing body at the village level.
110. Panchayats Act, supra note 107, at see. 4.
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recommendations can be construed as enlarging and elaborating the
scope and range of the fundamental rights of the citizens in India.
The argument that the WCD recommended SF-based decisionmaking process would lead to endless delays and render (due to the
delay) many projects impossible to build is totally unfounded. The
time period required by this process is likely to be a small fraction of
the total gestation period presently typical of large dams. In fact, the
net impact of this type of process would be to shorten the time for
implementation. Even in cases where the dams have been in the
planning stages for many years, it would be worthwhile to conduct a
review as recommended by the WCD.
In the end, the implementation of the WCD recommendations is
likely to result in justice for the affected people and the balance of
power shifting towards those who, to date, have been powerless and
voiceless. As a corollary, power would also shift away from the dambuilding establishment, technocrats, bureaucrats, and politicians.
This is at the root of the vehement and shrill opposition to the WCD
Report from some sections of the dam-building establishments.

